Watson v. Toney et al
South Carolina District Court | |
Judge: | Joseph Dawson, III |
Case #: | 4:25-cv-01861 |
Nature of Suit | 350 Torts - Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle |
Cause | 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.) |
Case Filed: | Mar 14, 2025 |
Case in other court: | Common Pleas, Marlboro County, 2025-CP-34-00035 |
Last checked: Monday Mar 17, 2025 11:11 AM EDT |
Defendant
Anna Pasour
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Represented By
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Defendant
Davis Pasour
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Represented By
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Defendant
Kiauzha Toney
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Plaintiff
Natori Watson
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Docket last updated: 04/24/2025 11:59 PM EDT |
Wednesday, April 16, 2025 | ||
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![]() ***DOCUMENT MAILED certified 16 Order on Motion to Dismissplaced in U.S. Mail from Florence Clerks Office to Hon. Marquita McLain PO Drawer 996 Bennettsville, SC 29512-0996 (swel, ) |
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![]() ***DOCUMENT E-MAILED Certified copy of 16 Order on Motion to Dismiss to Hon. Marquita McLain PO Drawer 996 Bennettsville, SC 29512-0996 (swel, ) |
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Att: 1
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16 | 16
order
Order on Motion to Dismiss
Wed 04/16 1:27 PM
TEXT ORDER remanding this case to the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas and denying as moot 7 the motion to dismiss filed by Anna and Davis Pasour ("the Pasour Defendants").On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff Natori Watson ("Watson") initiated a negligence action against Kiauzha Toney ("Toney") and the Pasour Defendants. (See DE 1-1 at 1.) On March 14, 2025, the Pasour Defendants removed this case to this Court, purportedly under this Court's diversity jurisdiction. (DE 1.) While the Pasour Defendants acknowledge that Toney is a citizen of South Carolina, they contend that Toney is a so-called "nominal" party whose citizenship must be disregarded because Watson "has only been named as a defendant so that [Watson] may pursue underinsured motorist ["UIM"] benefits" via Watson's insurance carrier. (Id. at 2; DE 14 at 1.)As a general matter, removal by a defendant to federal court is proper when the plaintiffs and defendants to a lawsuit are "complete[ly] divers[e]," Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2015), and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a), (b). This is a diversity jurisdiction case. (DE 1 at 2.) Accordingly, "complete diversity of citizens is necessary..., meaning the plaintiff cannot be a citizen of the same state as any other defendant." Weidman, 776 F.3d at 218. However, "the Supreme Court has instructed that complete diversity should be guided by 'real and substantial parties to the controversy,' and not 'nominal or formal parties.'" Brave Ventures, LLC v. Ambrester, 854 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 46061 (1980)).Party classification involves a two-step "principal[-]purpose" test. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 165, 172 (4th Cir. 2018). "First, the court must determine the primary issue in the controversy. Next, the court should align the parties according to their positions with respect to the primary issue." U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. A & S Mfg. Co., 48 F.3d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1995).The Pasour Defendants' contentions notwithstanding, Toney is not a nominal defendant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. To begin with, the "primary issue addressed in the complaint" is the extent of Toney and the Pasour Defendants' liability for Watson's injuries. Brave Ventures, LLC, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 358. The entire complaint boils down to allegations that Watson suffered "significant head trauma" including "a brain injury" as a result of an automobile collision between Toney and the Pasour Defendants. (See DE 1-2 at 1.) And as for Toney specifically, Watson alleges (among other things) that he:"drove at a speed greater than [wa]s reasonable and prudent"; "failed to yield the right of way"; and "dr[ove] while distracted[.]" (Id. at 45.) To be sure, Toney has not yet appeared in this Court. (See DE 1 at 2 (so arguing).) But aside from the fact that the Pasour Defendants provided no affidavit of service of Toney in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, the Pasour Defendants provide no explanation for why Toney's interest in avoiding civil liability is a sham. Indeed, South Carolina law requires liability be established before underinsured benefits accrue. See S.C. Code § 38-77-160 (current through 2025 Act No. 1); see also Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 583, 482 S.E.2d 589, 594 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) ("The central purpose of the UIM statute is to provide coverage where the injured party's damages exceed the liability limits of the at-fault motorist."). The Pasour Defendants do not contend (as was their burden) that Toney's liability has already been established or (for example) that Watson and Toney signed a covenant not-to-execute, which could call alignment into question. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the burden for establishing jurisdiction is on the removing party). Nor is this a declaratory judgment action for UIM benefits. See Lloyd v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 2d 812, 816 (E.D. Va. 2010). To the contrary, Watson seeks damages. (DE 1-2 at 6.) Thus, "[t]he pleadings and the nature of the suit clearly manifest the proper alignment of the dispute[,]" U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 48 F.3d at 134, namely, Watson on the one side and Toney and the Pasour Defendants on the other. Toney's South Carolina citizenship cannot therefore be disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.It follows that, given no federal question and given that the parties are not completely diverse, the Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331--32; Weidman, 776 F.3d at 218. This has two immediate implications. First, "subject-matter jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to any merits decision by a federal court[.]" Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court cannot adjudicate the Pasour Defendants' motion to dismiss, and so, the same must be denied as moot. Second, this case must be remanded to the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject[-] matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."). It is so ordered. Signed by Honorable Joseph Dawson, III on 4/16/25.(swel, ) |
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Monday, April 07, 2025 | ||
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![]() REPLY to Response to Motion re7 MOTION to Dismiss Response filed by Davis Pasour, Anna Pasour. (Fulton, Joseph) |
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Monday, March 31, 2025 | ||
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![]() RESPONSE in Opposition re7 MOTION to Dismiss Response filed by Natori Watson.Reply to Response to Motion due by 4/7/2025 Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. (Watson, Mackenzie) |
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Thursday, March 27, 2025 | ||
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![]() Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Natori Watson.(Watson, Mackenzie) |
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Wednesday, March 26, 2025 | ||
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![]() NOTICE of Appearance by Mackenzie Paige Watson on behalf of Natori Watson (Watson, Mackenzie) |
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Monday, March 17, 2025 | ||
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![]() Additional Attachments to Main Document7 MOTION to Dismiss . First attachment description: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss .(Fulton, Joseph) |
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![]() MOTION to Dismiss by Davis Pasour, Anna Pasour. Response to Motion due by 3/31/2025. Add an additional 3 days only if served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 45. No proposed order.(Fulton, Joseph) |
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Friday, March 14, 2025 | ||
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![]() Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Davis Pasour.(swel, ) |
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![]() Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories by Anna Pasour.(swel, ) |
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![]() NOTICE OF REMOVAL from Common Pleas, Marlboro County, case number 2025-CP 34-00035 (Filing fee $ 405 receipt number ASCDC-12326972), filed by Anna Pasour, Davis Pasour.(swel, ) |
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